Microsoft

Microsoft Defender para punto de conexión

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Windows Defender

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Información general de Solorigate

Cómo puede ayudar Microsoft Defender para punto de conexión

01. El método llamado Start

02. Puerta trasera y elevación de privilegios

03. Puerta trasera y cargas del segundo nivel

04. Pasos para detener la difusión con puntos de conexión

05. Pasos para detener la difusión con redes

06. Informe de análisis de amenazas y búsqueda

Microsoft Security

```
internal void RefreshInternal()
{
    if (log.get_IsDebugEnabled())
    {
        log.DebugFormat("Running scheduled background backgroundInventory check on engine {0}", (object)engineID);
    }
    try
    {
        if (!OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.IsAlive)
        {
            Thread thread = new Thread(OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.Initialize);
            thread.IsBackground = true;
            thread.Start();
        }
    }
    catch (Exception)
    {
    }
    if (backgroundInventory.IsRunning)
    {
        log.Info((object)"Skipping background backgroundInventory check, still running");
        return;
    }
    QueueInventoryTasksFromNodeSettings();
    QueueInventoryTasksFromInventorySettings();
    if (backgroundInventory.QueueSize > 0)
    {
        backgroundInventory.Start();
    }
}
```


SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe
Flujo de ejecución normal
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.CoreBusinessLayerPlugin
Start()
ScheduleBackgroundInventory()
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.BackgroundInventory.InventoryManager
Start()
Refresh()
RefreshInternal()
BackgroundInventory.Start()
Adición malintencionada
OrionImprovementBusinessLayer
Initialize()
MITRE T1195.002
Poner en peligro la cadena de suministro:
Comprometer la cadena de suministro
de software

Ejemplo de dominio generado:



ATAQUE A LA CADENA DE SUMINISTRO
Los atacantes insertan código malintencionado en un componente DLL de software legítimo. El archivo DLL en peligro se distribuye a las organizaciones que usan el software relacionado.

EJECUCIÓN, PERSISTENCIA
Cuando el software se ejecuta, el archivo DLL en peligro se carga y el código malintencionado insertado llama la función que contiene las capacidades de puerta trasera.

DEFENSA EVASIÓN
La puerta trasera tiene una lista larga de comprobaciones para asegurarse de que se está ejecutando en una red real en peligro.

RECON
La puerta trasera recopila información del sistema

C2 INICIAL
La puerta trasera se conecta a un servidor de comando y control. El dominio se conecta parcialmente basándose en la información recopilada del sistema y hace que cada subdominio sea único. La puerta trasera puede recibir una dirección C2 adicional a la que conectarse.

FILTRACIÓN
La puerta trasera envía la información que ha recopilado al atacante.

ATAQUE CON TECLADO
La puerta trasera ejecuta comandos que recibe de los atacantes. La amplia gama de funciones de la puerta trasera les permite a los atacantes realizar actividades adicionales, tales como el robo de credenciales, la elevación de privilegios progresiva y el movimiento lateral.




Red
Archivo
Registro
Proceso
SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
Puerta trasera de Solorigate
1
DNS: [DGA].avsvmcloud.com
conectar
2
C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs
C:\Windows\[folder2]\[teardrop].dll
depositar
3
HKLM\[...]\|FEO\dllhost.exe\Debugger = "wscript.exe C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs"
reg create
4
wscript.exe C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs
dllhost.exe
(ejecución legítima al azar)
proc create
wscript.exe
C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs
proc create
reg delete
5
Rundll32.exe C:\Windows\[folder2]\[teardrop].dll, Tk_[fakeexport]
6
HKLM\[...]\|FEO\dllhost.exe\Debugger
rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\[folder2]\[cargador personalizado].dll
conectar
7
HTTPS: [dominio C2]

Aislar e investigar dispositivos

Investigar escala de tiempo para el movimiento lateral



Identificar cuentas

Investigar origen del peligro


Microsoft 365 security
Home
Incidents & alerts
Hunting
Action center
Threat analytics
Secure score
Endpoints
Search
Dashboard
Device inventory
Vulnerability management
Partners and APIs
Evaluation & tutorials
Configuration management
Email & collaboration
Investigations
Explorer
Submissions
Review
Campaigns
Threat tracker
Attack simulation training
Policies & rules
Reports
Incidents > Multi-stage incident involving Execution & Collection on multiple endpoints
Manage incident
Consult a threat expert
Comments and history
Summary
Alerts (31)
Devices (2)
Users (3)
Mailboxes (0)
Investigations (5)
Evidence (31)
Alerts and categories
31/31 active alerts
5 MITRE ATT&CK tactics
2 other alert categories
Dec 22, 2020, 1:52:20 AM | New
A WMI event filter was bound to a suspicious event consumer on desktop-3u4jij1
Dec 22, 2020, 11:08:57 AM | New
Process launched with the security context of another user on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:37:49 AM | New
Suspicious file deletion activity was observed on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Scheduled task possibly hijacked on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Suspicious remote activity on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Suspicious file creation initiated remotely on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 12:48:39 PM | New
Abnormal remote scheduled task modification on win-9njrns9ohht by user -
Dec 22, 2020, 12:48:39 PM | New
Suspicious file creation initiated remotely on win-9njrns9ohht by user
Scope
2 impacted devices
3 impacted users
Top impacted entities
Entity type
Risk level/investigation priority
Tags
High
High
No data available
No data available
No data available
View entities
Evidence
31 entities found
View all entities
Incident Information
Associated incidents
Incident ID
Reason
Entity
24851
24576
24576
Tags summary
Incident tags
Data sensitivity
Device groups
User groups
Incident details
Status
Active
Severity
High
Incident ID
24963
First activity
First - Dec 22, 2020, 1:52:20 AM
Last activity
Last - Dec 22, 2020, 7:09:58 PM
Classification
(Not set)
Determination
Not set
Assigned to
Unassigned
Give feedback


Microsoft Defender Security Center
Alerts > Suspicious LDAP query
Suspicious LDAP query
Microsoft Defender Security Center
Alerts > 'Solorigate' high-severity malware was prevented
Microsoft Defender Security Center
Alerts > ADFS private key extraction attempt
ADFS private key extraction attempt
Risk level High
ALERT STORY
Collapse all
[4280] SecurityHealthSystray.exe
[7448] OneDrive.exe /background
File create
dump_em_all.exe
Suspicious file dropped
Medium New Detected
[7956] dump_em_all.exe
Image load
dump_em_all.exe
Suspicious file dropped
Medium New Detected
dump_em_all.exe ran an LDAP query
LDAP Search query (&(thumbnailphoto=*)(objectClass=contact)(!(cn=CryptoPolicy)))
Distinguished name CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data,DC=ATP,DC=local
Action time Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM
ADFS private key extraction attempt
High New Detected
[7936] WerFault.exe -u -p 7956 -s 1428
Details
ADFS private key extraction attempt
High New
See in timeline
Link to another incident
Assign to me
Manage alert
Classify this alert
True alert
False alert
Status New
Classification Select classification...
Alert details
Incident Multi-stage incident involving Execution & Credential access on one endpoint (open in Microsoft 365 Defender)
Detection source EDR
Detection technology Behavioral
Detection status Detected
Category CredentialAccess
Techniques T1003: OS Credential Dumping
T1528: Steal Application Access Token
First activity Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM
Last activity Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM

Threats > **Solorigate supply chain attack**

Overview | Analyst report | Mitigations

Microsoft security researchers recently discovered a sophisticated attack where an adversary inserted malicious code into a supply chain development process. A malicious software class was included among many other legitimate classes and then signed with a legitimate certificate. The resulting binary included a backdoor and was then discreetly distributed into targeted organizations. This attack was discovered as part of an ongoing investigation.

Cybercriminals target supply chains and look for weaknesses they can exploit to discreetly enter another target environment. In this case, attackers targeted the SolarWinds Orion Platform to infiltrate the supply chain that helps businesses manage networks, systems, and information technology infrastructure. This attack leveraged the trust associated with the supplier and certificate to insert targeted code to use in a larger campaign.

Based on research, this attack represents nation-state activity at significant scale, aimed at both the government and private sector. The actor is known to be focused on high value targets such as government agencies and cybersecurity companies.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects this attack. It raises an alert when it detects the threat on your device; however, to avoid adverse impact on legitimate services Microsoft Defender for Endpoint will not automatically remediate it.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus protects against this threat. It blocks the known malicious SolarWinds binaries associated with this threat on your device.

Read the full analyst report

Devices with alerts over time

Devices with alerts

0 devices with active alerts

Secure configuration status

1.41k misconfigured devices

Exposed | Secure | Unknown | Not applicable

View mitigation details

Vulnerability patching status

0 vulnerable devices

Exposed | Secure

View mitigation details

Serie de videos sobre Solorigate

Siguientes pasos

01. Ver la series de videos de Solorigate en esta ubicación

02. Visita Microsoft Security para más actualizaciones: www.microsoft.com/es-mx/security/business

03. Lee las publicaciones en el blog en: www.microsoft.com/security/blog

https://aka.ms/solorigate

Microsoft Security

Microsoft