Microsoft

Microsoft Defender за крайна точка

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Главен ръководител за изследване на защитата

Windows Defender

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Общ преглед на Solorigate

Как Microsoft Defender за крайна точка може да помогне

01. Методът с име „Старт“

02. Достъп през задната врата и ескалиране на привилегиите

03. Достъп през задната врата и полезни данни на втория етап

04. Стъпки за спиране на разпространението с крайни точки

05. Стъпки за спиране на разпространението с мрежи

06. Отчет и проактивно търсене на набора анализи за заплахи

Microsoft Security

```
internal void RefreshInternal()
{
    if (log.get_IsDebugEnabled())
    {
        log.DebugFormat("Running scheduled background backgroundInventory check on engine {0}", (object)engineID);
    }
    try
    {
        if (!OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.IsAlive)
        {
            Thread thread = new Thread(OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.Initialize);
            thread.IsBackground = true;
            thread.Start();
        }
    }
    catch (Exception)
    {
    }
    if (backgroundInventory.IsRunning)
    {
        log.Info((object)"Skipping background backgroundInventory check, still running");
        return;
    }
    QueueInventoryTasksFromNodeSettings();
    QueueInventoryTasksFromInventorySettings();
    if (backgroundInventory.QueueSize > 0)
    {
        backgroundInventory.Start();
    }
}
```


SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe
Редовен поток на изпълнение
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.CoreBusinessLayerPlugin
Start()
ScheduleBackgroundInventory()
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.BackgroundInventory.InventoryManager
Start()
Refresh()
RefreshInternal()
BackgroundInventory.Start()
Злонамерено добавяне
OrionImprovementBusinessLayer
Initialize()
MITRE T1195.002
Компрометиране на веригата за доставка:
Компрометиране на верига за доставка на софтуер

Пример за генериран домейн:



АТАКА КЪМ ВЕРИГА ЗА ДОСТАВКА
Атакуващите вмъкват злонамерен код в DLL компонент на легитимен софтуер. Компрометираната DLL се разпространява до организации, които използват свързания софтуер.

ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕ, УСТОЙЧИВОСТ
Когато софтуерът се стартира, компрометираната DLL се зарежда и вмъкнатият злонамерен код извиква функцията, която съдържа възможностите за задна врата.

ЗАОБИКАЛЯНЕ НА ЗАЩИТАТА
Задната врата има дълъг списък с проверки, за да е сигурно, че се изпълнява в действителна компрометирана мрежа.

РАЗУЗНАВАНЕ
Задната врата събира системна информация

ПЪРВОНАЧАЛЕН C2
Задната врата се свързва към сървър за управление и контрол. Домейнът, към който се свързва, се базира частично на информацията, събрана от системата, което прави всеки поддомейн уникален. Задната врата може да получи допълнителен C2 адрес, към който да се свърже.

ЕКСФИЛТРИРАНЕ
Задната врата изпраща събраната информация на хакера.

АТАКА С РЪЦЕ НА КЛАВИАТУРАТА
Задната врата изпълнява командите, които получава от хакерите. Широката гама от възможности на задната врата позволява на хакерите да извършват допълнителни дейности, като кражба на идентификационни данни, постепенно нарастващо ескалиране на привилегиите и странично движение.




Мрежа
Файл
Системен регистър
Процес
SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
Задна врата за Solorigate
dllhost.exe
(случайно законово изпълнение)
wscript.exe
C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs
rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\[folder2]\[custom loader].dll
1
DNS:
[DGA].avsvmcloud.com
свързване
2
C:\Windows\[fo|der1]\[trigger].vbs
C:\Windows\[folder2]\[teardrop].dll
пускане
3
HKLM\[...]\|FEO\dllhost.exe\Debugger = "wscript.exe C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs"
създаване на регистър
4
wscript.exe C:\Windows\[folder1]\[trigger].vbs
създаване на proc
създаване на proc
5
Rundll32.exe C:\Windows\[folder2]\[teardrop].dll, Tk_[fakeexport]
изтриването на регистъра
6
HKLM\[...]\|FEO\dllhost.exe\Debugger
свързване
7
HTTPS: [C2 домейн]

Изолиране и изследване на устройства

Изследване на времевата линия за странично движение



Идентифициране на акаунти

Изследване на произхода на компрометирането


Microsoft 365 security
Home
Incidents & alerts
Hunting
Action center
Threat analytics
Secure score
Endpoints
Search
Dashboard
Device inventory
Vulnerability management
Partners and APIs
Evaluation & tutorials
Configuration management
Email & collaboration
Investigations
Explorer
Submissions
Review
Campaigns
Threat tracker
Attack simulation training
Policies & rules
Reports
Incidents > Multi-stage incident involving Execution & Collection on multiple endpoints
Manage incident
Consult a threat expert
Comments and history
Summary
Alerts (31)
Devices (2)
Users (3)
Mailboxes (0)
Investigations (5)
Evidence (31)
Alerts and categories
31/31 active alerts
5 MITRE ATT&CK tactics
2 other alert categories
Dec 22, 2020, 1:52:20 AM | New
A WMI event filter was bound to a suspicious event consumer on desktop-3u4jij1
Dec 22, 2020, 11:08:57 AM | New
Process launched with the security context of another user on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:37:49 AM | New
Suspicious file deletion activity was observed on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Scheduled task possibly hijacked on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Suspicious remote activity on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Suspicious file creation initiated remotely on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
Dec 22, 2020, 12:48:39 PM | New
Abnormal remote scheduled task modification on win-9njrns9ohht by user -
Dec 22, 2020, 12:48:39 PM | New
Suspicious file creation initiated remotely on win-9njrns9ohht by user
Scope
2 impacted devices
3 impacted users
Top impacted entities
Entity type
Risk level/investigation priority
Tags
High
High
No data available
No data available
No data available
View entities
Evidence
31 entities found
View all entities
Incident Information
Associated incidents
Incident ID
Reason
Entity
24851
24576
24576
Tags summary
Incident tags
Data sensitivity
Device groups
User groups
Incident details
Status
Active
Severity
High
Incident ID
24963
First activity
First - Dec 22, 2020, 1:52:20 AM
Last activity
Last - Dec 22, 2020, 7:09:58 PM
Classification
(Not set)
Determination
Not set
Assigned to
Unassigned
Give feedback


Microsoft Defender Security Center
Alerts > Suspicious LDAP query
Suspicious LDAP query
Microsoft Defender Security Center
Alerts > 'Solorigate' high-severity malware was prevented
Microsoft Defender Security Center
Alerts > ADFS private key extraction attempt
ADFS private key extraction attempt
Risk level High
ALERT STORY
Collapse all
[4280] SecurityHealthSystray.exe
[7448] OneDrive.exe /background
File create
dump_em_all.exe
Suspicious file dropped
Medium New Detected
[7956] dump_em_all.exe
Image load
dump_em_all.exe
Suspicious file dropped
Medium New Detected
dump_em_all.exe ran an LDAP query
LDAP Search query (&(thumbnailphoto=*)(objectClass=contact)(!(cn=CryptoPolicy)))
Distinguished name CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data,DC=ATP,DC=local
Action time Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM
ADFS private key extraction attempt
High New Detected
[7936] WerFault.exe -u -p 7956 -s 1428
Details
ADFS private key extraction attempt
High New
See in timeline
Link to another incident
Assign to me
Manage alert
Classify this alert
True alert
False alert
Status New
Classification Select classification...
Alert details
Incident Multi-stage incident involving Execution & Credential access on one endpoint (open in Microsoft 365 Defender)
Detection source EDR
Detection technology Behavioral
Detection status Detected
Category CredentialAccess
Techniques T1003: OS Credential Dumping
T1528: Steal Application Access Token
First activity Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM
Last activity Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM

Threats > **Solorigate supply chain attack**

Overview | Analyst report | Mitigations

Microsoft security researchers recently discovered a sophisticated attack where an adversary inserted malicious code into a supply chain development process. A malicious software class was included among many other legitimate classes and then signed with a legitimate certificate. The resulting binary included a backdoor and was then discreetly distributed into targeted organizations. This attack was discovered as part of an ongoing investigation.

Cybercriminals target supply chains and look for weaknesses they can exploit to discreetly enter another target environment. In this case, attackers targeted the SolarWinds Orion Platform to infiltrate the supply chain that helps businesses manage networks, systems, and information technology infrastructure. This attack leveraged the trust associated with the supplier and certificate to insert targeted code to use in a larger campaign.

Based on research, this attack represents nation-state activity at significant scale, aimed at both the government and private sector. The actor is known to be focused on high value targets such as government agencies and cybersecurity companies.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects this attack. It raises an alert when it detects the threat on your device; however, to avoid adverse impact on legitimate services Microsoft Defender for Endpoint will not automatically remediate it.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus protects against this threat. It blocks the known malicious SolarWinds binaries associated with this threat on your device.

Read the full analyst report

Devices with alerts over time

Devices with alerts

0 devices with active alerts

Secure configuration status

1.41k misconfigured devices

Exposed | Secure | Unknown | Not applicable

View mitigation details

Vulnerability patching status

0 vulnerable devices

Exposed | Secure

View mitigation details

Поредица от видеоклипове за Solorigate

Следващи стъпки

01. Гледайте поредицата видеоклипове за Solorigate на това място

02. Посетете Microsoft Security за още актуализации: www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business

03. Прочетете публикациите в блога на адрес: www.microsoft.com/security/blog

https://aka.ms/solorigate

Microsoft Security