



Microsoft Defender для конечной точки

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Чем полезно решение Microsoft Defender для конечной точки

- 01.** Метод Start
- 02.** Бэкдор-доступ и повышение привилегий
- 03.** Бэкдор-доступ и полезные данные второго этапа
- 04.** Инструкции по остановке распространения с помощью конечных точек
- 05.** Инструкции по остановке распространения с помощью сетей
- 06.** Отчет об аналитике угроз и охота на угрозы

```
internal void RefreshInternal()
{
    if (Log.get_IsDebugEnabled())
    {
        Log.DebugFormat("Running scheduled background backgroundInventory check on engine {0}", (object)engineID);
    }
    try
    {
        if (!OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.IsAlive)
        {
            Thread thread = new Thread(OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.Initialize);
            thread.IsBackground = true;
            thread.Start();
        }
    }
    catch (Exception)
    {
    }
    if (backgroundInventory.IsRunning)
    {
        Log.Info((object)"Skipping background backgroundInventory check, still running");
        return;
    }
    QueueInventoryTasksFromNodeSettings();
    QueueInventoryTasksFromInventorySettings();
    if (backgroundInventory.QueueSize > 0)
    {
        backgroundInventory.Start();
    }
}
```

SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe

Регулярный поток
выполнения

SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.CoreBusinessLayerPlugin

Start ()

ScheduleBackgroundInventory ()

SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.BackgroundInventory.InventoryManager

Start ()

Refresh ()

RefreshInternal ()

BackgroundInventory.Start ()

Добавление вредоносной
программы

OrionImprovementBusinessLayer

Initialize ()




MITRE T1195.002

Компрометация цепочки поставок:

компрометация цепочки поставок
программного обеспечения

Пример сгенерированного домена:

3tmu76044hgf7shjf . appsync-api . eu-west-1 . avsvmcloud.com



АТАКА НА ЦЕПОЧКУ ПОСТАВОК

Злоумышленники вставляют вредоносный код в компонент DLL неподдельного программного обеспечения. Скомпрометированная библиотека DLL распространяется среди организаций, использующих соответствующее программное обеспечение.

ПОСТОЯННОЕ ИСПОЛНЕНИЕ

При запуске программного обеспечения загружается скомпрометированная библиотека DLL, а вставленный вредоносный код вызывает функцию с возможностями бэкдора.

ОБХОД ЗАЩИТЫ

У бэкдора есть длинный список проверок, работает ли он в реальной скомпрометированной сети.

ВЫВЕРКА

Бэкдор собирает сведения о системе

НАЧАЛЬНАЯ АТАКА С КОМАНДНЫМ ЦЕНТРОМ


Бэкдор подключается к серверу контроля и управления. Домен, к которому он подключается, частично использует сведения, полученные из системы, что делает каждый поддомен уникальным. Бэкдор может получить дополнительный адрес командного центра для подключения.


КРАЖА

Бэкдор отправляет собранные сведения злоумышленнику.

УПРАВЛЯЕМАЯ АТАКА


Бэкдор выполняет команды, полученные от злоумышленников. Широкий спектр возможностей бэкдора позволяет злоумышленникам выполнять дополнительные действия, такие как кража учетных данных, постепенное повышение привилегий и боковое смещение.





Изолируйте и исследуйте
устройства

Изучите временную
шкалу бокового
смещения



Определите
учетные записи

Исследуйте происхождение
компрометации

- Home
- Incidents & alerts
- Hunting
- Action center
- Threat analytics
- Secure score
- Endpoints
 - Search
 - Dashboard
 - Device inventory
 - Vulnerability management
 - Partners and APIs
 - Evaluation & tutorials
 - Configuration management
- Email & collaboration
- Investigations
- Explorer
- Submissions
- Review
- Campaigns
- Threat tracker
- Attack simulation training
- Policies & rules
- Reports

Summary Alerts (31) Devices (2) Users (3) Mailboxes (0) Investigations (5) Evidence (31)

Alerts and categories

31/31 active alerts
5 MITRE ATT&CK tactics
2 other alert categories



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- Dec 22, 2020, 1:52:20 AM | New
A WMI event filter was bound to a suspicious event consumer on desktop-Ju4jij1
- Dec 22, 2020, 11:08:57 AM | New
Process launched with the security context of another user on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
- Dec 22, 2020, 11:37:49 AM | New
Suspicious file deletion activity was observed on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
- Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Scheduled task possibly hijacked on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
- Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Suspicious remote activity on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
... and more.
- Dec 22, 2020, 11:58:50 AM | New
Suspicious file creation initiated remotely on win-9njrns9ohht by user mind0xp
- Dec 22, 2020, 12:48:39 PM | New
Abnormal remote scheduled task modification on win-9njrns9ohht by user
... and more.
- Dec 22, 2020, 12:48:39 PM | New
Suspicious file creation initiated remotely on win-9njrns9ohht by user

Scope

2 impacted devices
3 impacted users

Top impacted entities

| Entity type | Risk level/investigation priority | Tags |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|------|
| Device | High | |
| Device | High | |
| User | No data available | |
| User | No data available | |
| User | No data available | |

View entities

Evidence

31 entities found

View all entities

Incident Information

This incident might be associated with...

Associated Incidents

| Incident ID | Reason | Entity |
|-------------|-----------|---------------|
| 24851 | Same file | system.exe |
| 24576 | Same file | legit_payf... |
| 24576 | Same file | pay/bwd/dl |

Tags summary

Incident tags

Data sensitivity

Device groups

User groups

Incident details

Status

Active

Severity

High

Incident ID

24963

First activity

First - Dec 22, 2020, 1:52:20 AM

Last activity

Last - Dec 22, 2020, 7:09:58 PM

Classification

(Not set)

Determination

Not set

Assigned to

Unassigned

Give feedback

Microsoft Defender Security Center

Alerts > Suspicious LDAP query

Suspicious LDAP query

win-9njrns9ohht.atp.local

ALERT STORY

[3308] userinit.exe

[576] explorer.exe

lib ATP/min...

Suspicious

File create

sqlcsp.exe

System f...

[3552] cmd.exe

Suspicious

Suspicious

[5004] w...

Mass

Syst

cmd.exe

Original f...

Action file

Mitre text

Target file

Syst

[3732] sq...

Mass

Syst

https://securitycenter.windows.com/incidents/24433

Microsoft Defender Security Center

Alerts > 'Solorigate' high-severity malware was prevented

'Solorigate' high-severity malware was prevented

Risk level High

ALERT STORY

Microsoft Defender Security Center

Alerts > ADFS private key extraction attempt

ADFS private key extraction attempt

Risk level High

ALERT STORY

[4280] SecurityHealthSystray.exe

[7448] OneDrive.exe /background

File create

dump_em_all.exe

Suspicious file dropped Medium New Detected

[7956] dump_em_all.exe

Image load

dump_em_all.exe

Suspicious file dropped Medium New Detected

dump_em_all.exe ran an LDAP query

LDAP Search query (&{(thumbnailphoto=*)(objectClass=contact)!{(cn=CryptoPolicy)}})

Distinguished name CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data,DC=ATP,DC=local

Action time Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM

ADFS private key extraction attempt High New Detected

[7936] WerFault.exe -u -p 7956 -s 1428

Details

ADFS private key extraction attempt

High New

See in timeline Link to another incident Assign to me

Manage alert

Classify this alert True alert False alert

Status New

Classification Select classification...

Alert details

Incident Multi-stage incident involving Execution & Credential access on one endpoint (open in Microsoft 365 Defender)

Detection source EDR

Detection technology Behavioral

Detection status Detected

Category CredentialAccess

Techniques T1003: OS Credential Dumping T1528: Steal Application Access Token

First activity Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM

Last activity Jan 10, 2021, 7:09:02 PM

Threats > Solorigate supply chain attack

Overview Analyst report Mitigations

Microsoft security researchers recently discovered a sophisticated attack where an adversary inserted malicious code into a supply chain development process. A malicious software class was included among many other legitimate classes and then signed with a legitimate certificate. The resulting binary included a backdoor and was then discreetly distributed into targeted organizations. This attack was discovered as part of an ongoing investigation.

Cybercriminals target supply chains and look for weaknesses they can exploit to discreetly enter another target environment. In this case, attackers targeted the SolarWinds Orion Platform to infiltrate the supply chain that helps businesses manage networks, systems, and information technology infrastructure. This attack leveraged the trust associated with the supplier and certificate to insert targeted code to use in a larger campaign.

Based on research, this attack represents nation-state activity at significant scale, aimed at both the government and private sector. The actor is known to be focused on high value targets such as government agencies and cybersecurity companies.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects this attack. It raises an alert when it detects the threat on your device; however, to avoid adverse impact on legitimate services Microsoft Defender for Endpoint will not automatically remediate it.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus protects against this threat. It blocks the known malicious SolarWinds binaries associated with this threat on your device.

[Read the full analyst report](#)

Devices with alerts over time



■ Devices with active alerts ■ Devices with resolved alerts

Secure configuration status

1.41k misconfigured devices



■ Exposed ■ Secure ■ Unknown ■ Not applicable

[View mitigation details](#)

Devices with alerts

0 devices with active alerts



Vulnerability patching status

0 vulnerable devices



■ Exposed ■ Secure

[View mitigation details](#)

Серия видео о Solorigate

Дальнейшие действия

- 01.** Посмотрите серию видео о Solorigate по этому адресу
- 02.** Следите за новостями на веб-сайте Microsoft Security:
www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business
- 03.** Ознакомьтесь с публикациями в блоге:
www.microsoft.com/security/blog

<https://aka.ms/solorigate>

