

Azure AD Workbooks

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Azure AD Identity Security

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Azure AD Workbook – Wie erkenne ich häufige Angriffsmuster?

1. Zugriff auf Azure AD Workbook
2. Teil 1: Geänderte Anmeldeinformationen für Anwendungen und Dienste/Authentifizierungsmethoden
3. Teil 2: Geänderte Verbundeinstellungen
4. Teil 3: Neu erteilte Berechtigungen für Dienstprinzipale
5. Teil 4: Änderungen an Mitgliedschaften in Dienstprinzipalen – Übersicht



1.

Melden Sie sich beim
Azure-Portal an.



2.

Wechseln Sie zu **Azure Active Directory** > **Überwachung** > **Arbeitsmappen**.



3.

Öffnen Sie im Abschnitt zur Fehlerbehebung den **Bericht für vertrauliche Vorgänge**.



1.

Geänderte Anmeldeinformationen für
Anwendungen und
Dienste/Authentifizierungsmethoden

- External Identities
- Roles and administrators
- Administrative units
- Enterprise applications
- Devices
- App registrations
- Identity Governance
- Application proxy
- Licenses
- Azure AD Connect
- Custom domain names
- Mobility (MDM and MAM)
- Password reset
- Company branding
- User settings
- Properties
- Security
- Monitoring
 - Sign-ins
 - Audit logs
 - Provisioning logs (Preview)
 - Logs
 - Diagnostic settings
- Workbooks
- Usage & insights
- Troubleshooting + Support
 - Virtual assistant (Preview)
 - New support request

Workbooks

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Feedback

Modified Application and Service Principal Credentials/Authentication Methods

Applications and service principals can have multiple authentication methods that are simultaneously valid. It's important to monitor updates to your service principal authentication methods in case bad actors are adding new rogue credentials to allow themselves to authenticate as that service principal.

TimeRange: Last 60 days

Operation name: All

Credential: All

Actor: All

Exclude actor: None

Number of application and service principals updated by authentication method (Last 60 days)




Top actors updating authentication methods (Last 60 days)

Search

Actor	Actor_Type	ServicePrincipalsChanged
Managed Service Identity	App	12
jeffs@woodgrove.ms	User	3
joeyc@woodgrove.ms	User	3
Azure AD Application Proxy	App	2
Domain Controller Services	App	1
Azure ESTS Service	App	1

Updates to service principal authentication methods over time



Recent updates to application/service principal authentication methods

Search

TimeGenerated	OperationName	Actor	Actor_Type	Service_Principal_Name	credential	Service_Principal_ID
1/25/2021, 2:03:34 AM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrovechecklist	Other/not logged	1af2f52c-f74f-4a86-8eec-d
1/25/2021, 2:03:34 AM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrovechecklist	AsymmetricX509Cert	1af2f52c-f74f-4a86-8eec-d
1/25/2021, 2:03:34 AM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrovechecklist	Other/not logged	1af2f52c-f74f-4a86-8eec-d
1/24/2021, 1:03:46 PM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrove-app	Other/not logged	dcfce8f2-17b4-4139-8d97-



1.

Geänderte Anmeldeinformationen für Anwendungen und Dienste/Authentifizierungsmethoden

Neuartige
Anmeldeinformationen für
Apps und Dienstprinzipale
einschließlich des Typs

Hauptakteure und die Anzahl
der geänderten
Anmeldeinformationen

Eine Zeitachse mit den
Änderungen von
Anmeldeinformationen



2.

Geänderte Verbundeinstellungen

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Workbooks Edit

Modified application and service principal credentials/authentication methods

New permissions granted to service principals

Directory role and group membership updates to service principals

Modified federation settings

Modified federation settings

This section monitors when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain. For example, this alert will trigger when a new Active Directory Federated Service (ADFS) TrustedRealm object, such as a signing certificate, is added to the domain. Modification to domain federation settings should be rare. Confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrator behavior.

TimeRange: Last 60 days

Operation: All

InitiatingUserOrApp: All

TimeGenerated	OperationName	InitiatingUserOrApp	AADOperationType	targetDisplayName	TargetResources	Result	UserAgent
12/18/2020, 8:59:57 PM	Set federation settings on domain	jeffs@woodgrove.ms	Update	woodgrove.net	[{"displayName":"woodgrove.net","administrativeUnits":[],...	success	
12/7/2020, 3:37:54 PM	Add verified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	Unknown	[{"displayName":"Unknown","administrativeUnits":[],"mod...	failure	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...
12/7/2020, 3:12:05 PM	Add verified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	Unknown	[{"displayName":"Unknown","administrativeUnits":[],"mod...	failure	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...
12/7/2020, 3:11:40 PM	Add unverified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	pre2.woodgrove.ms	[{"displayName":"pre2.woodgrove.ms","administrativeUnits...	success	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...
12/7/2020, 3:10:58 PM	Add verified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	Unknown	[{"displayName":"Unknown","administrativeUnits":[],"mod...	failure	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...

2.

Geänderte Verbundeinstellungen

Änderungen an bestehenden
Domain-
Verbundvertrauensstellungen

Neu hinzugefügte Domains und
Vertrauensstellungen



3.

Neu erteilte
Berechtigungen für
Dienstprinzipale

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Edit

New permissions granted to service principals

This section monitors for changes to OAuth 2.0 permissions granted to Service Principals. For example, this alert will trigger when a Service Principal is granted Application (AppOnly) permissions to read mail through the Microsoft Graph API. When this occurs, the Service Principal is added to an App Role with a value of Mail.Read.

An attacker could elevate their privileges by using a compromised account to grant new permissions to a Service Principal they control, or by tricking a user into granting permissions. Investigations should focus on high privilege permissions that either grant access to sensitive data, or represent opportunities for lateral movement by attackers.

The first view in this section focuses specifically on Application permissions, which generally (but not always) represent higher risk. The second view is broader- it includes Delegated (App+User) permissions grants and additional audit events.

TimeRange: Last 60 days

ClientApp: All

Resource: All

New Application (AppOnly) permissions added to service principals

Search

Resource	↑↓	ClientApp	↑↓	Role_Added	↑↓	Explanation	↑↓	InitiatingUserOrApp	↑↓	TimeGenerated	↑↓
Office 365 Exchange Online (4)											
JeffTestCreds2" (4)											
Microsoft Graph (4)											
JeffTestCreds2" (3)											
		JeffTestCreds2"		Application.Read.All"		"Read all applications"		jeffs@woodgrove.ms		12/20/2020, 1:54:46 PM	
		JeffTestCreds2"		"Mail.Send"		"Send mail as any user"		jeffs@woodgrove.ms		12/22/2020, 11:56:24 AM	
		JeffTestCreds2"		"Mail.ReadWrite"		"Read and write mail in all mailboxes"		jeffs@woodgrove.ms		12/22/2020, 11:56:24 AM	
Mimorony AuthTS API" (1)											
Office 365 SharePoint Online (1)											
JeffTestCreds2" (1)											

TimeRange: Last 48 hours

Operation: All

InitiatingUserOrApp: All

Recent app permissions activity

TimeGenerated	↑↓	InitiatingUserOrApp	↑↓	OperationName	↑↓	ClientApp	↑↓	Resource	↑↓	Result	↑↓
1/26/2021, 4:25:23 PM		jerryw@woodgrove.ms		Consent to application		CCE Test		Not logged		success	



4.

Änderungen an Mitgliedschaften in Dienstprinzipalen – Übersicht

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Workbooks Edit Refresh Undo Redo Help

Sensitive Operations Report - Apps, Service Principals and Federation Settings

Workspace: All

This workbook is intended to help identify suspicious application and service principal activity that may indicate compromises in your environment. [Learn more](#) about best practices to protect M365 from attacks.

- Modified application and service principal credentials/authentication methods
- New permissions granted to service principals

Directory role and group membership updates to service principals

Directory role and group membership updates to service principals

This section monitors for Service Principals being as members of Directory Roles (admin roles) or Groups. For example, this alert will trigger when a Service Principal is added to the Company Administrator or Application Administrator role.

An attacker could elevate their privileges by adding a Service Principal they control to a high privileged role or a group that is used to protect access to sensitive resources. Investigations should focus on administrator rules and Groups that either grant access to sensitive data or represent opportunities for lateral movement by attackers.

TimeRange: Last 60 days

Operation: Add member to role

InitiatingUserOrApp: All

TimeGenerated	InitiatingUserOrApp	ServicePrincipalDisplayName	GroupOrRoleNameAddedTo
12/22/2020, 11:49:13 AM	jeffs@woodgrove.com	JeffTestCreds2	"Application Administrator"
12/22/2020, 11:52:28 AM	jeffs@woodgrove.com	Risky App	"Global Administrator"
12/20/2020, 7:46:25 PM	jeffs@woodgrove.com	JeffTestCreds2	"Security Operator"

Select

☐ All

☒ Add member to role

☐ Add eligible member to role

☐ Add scoped member to role

☐ Add member to group

Modified federation settings

Der Solorigate-Angriff im Überblick

Die nächsten Schritte

- 1 Sehen Sie sich hier die Solorigate-Videoreihe an.
- 2 Bleiben Sie über Microsoft Security auf dem Laufenden: www.microsoft.com/de-de/security/business.
- 3 Lesen Sie die Blogbeiträge unter www.microsoft.com/security/blog/.

<https://aka.ms/solorigate>

